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ARGUMENT

Appellees/Defendants Evelyn L. Saunders and Saunders & Saunders filed their
Appellees' Brief on December 15, 2004 [hereinafter "Lawyers' Brief]. Appellee/
Defendant Cathie I. Foster filed her Appellee's Brief also on December 15, 2004
[hereinafter "Cathie's Brief']. Appellee/Defendant Gary Couillard filed no brief. The
arguments in the Lawyers' Brief and Cathie's Brief often overlap and in those
circumstances, to the extent possible, they will be replied to in a single argument. It is
important to remember, when reviewing the arguments in both briefs, that this case is
being reviewed, on Counts l-lll of the Amended Complaint, for a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, and on Counts IV-V, on a Rule 56 grant of summary judgment, so the
standards of review are as set forth in Appellant Lynn Foster ("Lynn's) Opening Brief.
I.

DEFENDANTS ESSENTIALLY IGNORE T H E CONTROLLING LAW THAT
ESTABLISHES THAT LYNN HAS ADEQUATELY PLEADED A CLAIM UNDER T H E
TORT O F WRONGFUL INITIATION, USE A N D / O R CONTINUATION O F CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS, NAMELY, GILBERT A N D T H E RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND)

§ 674(a).
The Lawyers' Brief and Cathie's Brief each incorrectly argue that the tort cause
of action pleaded in Count I of the Amended Complaint, for Wrongful Initiation, Use
And/Or Continuation of Civil Proceedings, R. 17-28, exists in the state of Utah strictly to
remedy a wrongful initiation of a lawsuit, and no other litigation abuses. See Lawyers'
Brief at 7-15, Cathie's Brief at 9-10. As shown below, these arguments entirely miss
the very purpose of the tort, as discussed by the most recent, and controlling, Utah
Supreme Court decision, Gilbert v. Ince, 1999 UT 65, 981 P.2d 841 [hereinafter
"Gilbert'], namely, to provide redress for acts of abusive litigation, not sustainable by

1

probable cause and engaged for an improper purpose.
Lynn prevailed against Cathie in the divorce proceeding on Cathie's claim that
she was entitled to payments of alimony even after Lynn died, a claim that is unheard of
in divorce law. The claim was not asserted for a proper adjudication of its merits.
Defendants argue that Lynn is exempted from relief under the tort because Cathie filed
for, and the parties were granted, a divorce, despite Lynn's success in defeating such
claim that his alimony obligation continues beyond his death. That is one among many
claims that would be subject to his pleaded claim herein, which claims in the divorce
were unsupported by probable cause and asserted for an improper purpose.
The language of the very sections of the
[hereinafter

"RESTATEMENT"]

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

expressly adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Gilbert,

as well as the comments to the

RESTATEMENT1

and the case law cited by Plaintiff, to

which Defendants have offered no response, all disavow Defendants' contentions as to
the limitations of the abusive litigation torts. The candor of the entire Lawyers' Brief is
called into question by the fact that they relegate the controlling Gilbert Utah Supreme
Court decision - which is where the Utah Supreme Court expressly adopts the
RESTATEMENTS

formulation of the torts - to an offhand reference in a single footnote,

and then only for the proposition that the torts have, in Utah, "historically been known
variously as either 'abuse of process' or 'malicious prosecution.'" Lawyers' Brief at 11 n.
2. Since the Gilbert adoption of the

RESTATEMENT

1

formulation establishes the current

The Utah Supreme Court expressly did not adopt the comments to the
leaving the analysis of those matters for another day. See id. fl 19, 981
P.2d at 846 n. 11.
RESTATEMENT,

2

law on this tort in Utah, such discounted treatment of Gilbert, and the

RESTATEMENT,

is

a telling commentary on the hollowness of the Lawyers' Briefs presentation of
argument about non-controlling, pre-Gilbert, i.e., pre-RESTATEMENT cases.
Cathie's Brief at least acknowledges that Gilbert adopted the

RESTATEMENTS

formulation of the tort. See Cathy's Brief at 10-11. Cathie then candidly concedes that,
under Gilbert, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant "has brought claims without
probable cause." Cathie's Brief at 11 (emphasis added). Cathie then reverts to a preGilbert definition of probable cause as requiring a "showing of purposeful harassment or
annoyance and, in most cases, malice." Id. at 11 (citing Baird v. Intermountain School
Federal Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877 (Utah 1976)). The

RESTATEMENT,

as adopted in

Gilbert, makes clear that such element is in fact met by pleading that a claim is brought
"for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which
the proceedings are based," Gilbert, 1999 UT 65, fi 19, 981 P.2d 841, 845-46 (quoting
RESTATEMENT

§ 674 and equating to Baird). Lynn has expressly pleaded these

elements in Amended Complaint fflj 21-26 R. 22.
Both the Lawyers' Brief and Cathie's Brief argue that the semantic difference
between a "theory" of recovery and a claim for relief is so significant at the pleading
stage that Lynn's use of the word "theories," as used by Judge Hilder in the divorce
action, see Amended Complaint fl 11 R. 20, precludes any possible claim from being
stated. Lynn has been unable to find any authority from any jurisdiction holding that
such a semantic difference in those terms could preclude any set of facts upon which
relief could be granted, and Defendants here cited no such holding.

3

Indeed, if only one theory of recovery sustains a claim for relief, the two
necessarily collapse into each other. However, even if, for the sake of argument only,
there were some technical distinction of semantics,2 such a consideration would not be
a proper basis to dismiss at the pleadings stage.

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 8(e) expressly

abolished any technical forms of pleading. See Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105,
1110 (Utah 1982)("Utah has adopted what is generally referred to as 'notice pleading.'
Rule 8(e), Utah R. Civ. P., specifically provides that 'no technical forms of pleadings or
motions are required.'") See generally Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910
P.2d 1218, 1221-22 (Utah 1996)(refusing dismissal on grounds of semantic error in
pleading).
Thus, the fact that Lynn chose to use Judge Hilder's language is not dispositive,
nor is Judge Hilder's own choice of words. Lynn's pleaded claims are adequate.3 The
efforts of the defendants to argue that the entire divorce lawsuit must, in its entirety,
have been brought without probable cause and for a purpose other than the just
adjudication of an entitlement to divorce, see Lawyers' Brief at 7-12 and Cathie's Brief
at 10-12, is simply unsupported under Gilbert or the

RESTATEMENT.

First, the Utah

Supreme Court in Gilbert recognized that it was dealing with classes of torts "involving

2

Any such claimed distinction seems unlikely to exist. "Claim" is defined as: "To
demand as one's own or as one's right; to assert; to urge; to insist. A cause of
action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 247 (West 1991).
3

Cathie's claim that she was entitled to receive alimony after Lynn was dead, her
claim that she owned real property that she had long ago conveyed by quit-claim deed
to separate legal entities, in one of which neither she nor Lynn even had any ownership
interest, and various other claims asserted, see R. 647-654, on all of which Lynn
prevailed, are all subject to the tort's remedies.
4

abusive manipulation of public judicial resources." Gilbert, 1999 UT 65 fl 16, 981 P.2d
at 845. Such a broad characterization of the reach of the torts belies the narrow
interpretation of their reach, as argued by defendants.
In adopting the

RESTATEMENT,

the Utah Supreme Court specifically sought to

bring analytical clarity to litigation abuse torts: "To preserve analytical clarity with
respect to the species of torts permitting suit for misuse of judicial proceedings, we
apply the

RESTATEMENTS

formulation of wrongful use of civil proceedings." Id. H 19,

981 P.2d at 846. In order to preserve such analytical clarity, one must do what
defendants avoid, namely, focus on Gilbert and the
counsel the restrictions that defendants argue.

RESTATEMENT

itself, neither of which

]

The defendants' arguments simply seek a reversion to analytical confusion. If
the defendants' proffered arguments about the scope of the abusive litigation torts were
correct, the Utah Supreme Court in Gilbert, would have found unnecessary its analytical
statement4 that: "Gilbert likewise failed to negate probable cause on Gunnoe's
allegation that she acted under a conflict of interest." Id. lj 25, 981 P.2d at 847
(emphasis added). A "theory" of "conflict of interest" would not be subject to a probable
cause analysis under the tort as argued by defendants, yet the Utah Supreme Court
found it essential to determine such issue as part of its rationale for holding that
Gilbert's claim against Ince, founded upon a conflict of interest theory, failed.
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court itself described its analysis as directed to a

^Gilbert was decided during a jury trial, on a motion for directed verdict. See
1999 UT65U 13, 981 P.2d at 844. It was therefore decided under a different standard
of review than is applicable to this case. See id. fl 14.
5

single "allegation" of a "claim:" "Although the information upon which Ince acted in
alleging conflict of interest was somewhat tenuous, it cannot be said that the
inference provided insufficient probable cause for the claim." Id. fl 26, 981 P.2d at 848
(emphasis added). Thus, all of the Lawyer Briefs parsing of other cases' gratuitous
references to "proceedings," "lawsuits," "suits," "civil actions," and the like, see, e.g.
Lawyers' Brief at 8-9 & n.1, is for naught, especially when, contrary to the apparentlydesired impression offered by their citations, not one of the cited cases holds that
individual claims or, as the Utah Supreme Court analyzed in Gilbert, "allegations" was
immune from the abusive litigation torts. The Lawyers' Brief, at 11-2 & n. 4, also cites
Karenius v. Merchants' Protective Association, 65 Utah 183, 235 P. 880 (1925),
claiming that it stands for the proposition that the abusive litigation torts may not be
applied in multiple-claim actions if a single claim is valid. This case predates the
adoption of the

RESTATEMENT

in Gilbert by three quarters of a century. More significant,

however, is the fact omitted from the Lawyers' Brief, namely, that Karenius' own
attorney acknowledged that Karenius' claim "[was] not one for malicious abuse of
process, nor for malicious prosecution without probable cause." Karenius, 235 P. at
883. Since the pleaded claim was conceded by Karenius' counsel not to be one of the
abusive litigation torts, the case could have no bearing here.
Neither the Lawyers' Brief nor Cathie's Brief even attempts to address the
Greenberg v. Wolfberg, 890 P.2d 895, 904 (Okla. 1995) decision cited in Lynn's
Opening Brief at 18 n.3, which supports exactly what the Utah Supreme Court did in
Gilbert, in analyzing the allegation of conflict of interest as the predicate for a breach of

6

fiduciary duty claim. The defendants, in their arguments, also ignore the plain language
of the

RESTATEMENT,

itself, as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, which uses the

phrase "the claim" as the specific object of what has been brought forth for adjudication:
"he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other than that of securing
the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are based
RESTATEMENT

..."

§ 674(a)(emphasis added).5 Such resounding silence on these important

citations speaks to the lack of merit in defendants' arguments.6
The Lawyers Brief, makes note that the state of California has a bright line policy
rule, created by the courts, against applying the abusive litigation torts in the area of
family law, citing to Bidna v. Rosen, 19 Cal.App.4th 27, 35 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251 (Cal. Ct.
5

This RESTATEMENT section was expressly adopted as the law of Utah in Gilbert,
fl 19, 981 P.2d at 845-46, yet not one word about this section appears in either of
defendants' briefs. The plain language of this section brings within reach of the tort a
litigant's acts undertaken without probable cause. In other words, it could be initiation
of a lawsuit, the continuation in asserting a particular claim or any other act of litigation
abuse that fits the elements of the tort - there is no limitation beyond the expressed
elements.
defendants instead seek to distinguish Lynn's citation of the en banc decision of
the California Supreme Court in Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 694, 881 P.2d
1083, 1099, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 402 (Cal. 1994)(en banc), arguing that a decision by
the First District of Division 2 of the California Court of Appeals "explains" the Supreme
Court's en banc decision. See Lawyers' Brief at 13 (citing Merlet v. Rizzo, 64 Cal. App.
4th 53, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 83 (1998)). The Merlet Court purported to know better than the
en banc California Supreme Court, the importance of the Supreme Court's
pronouncements on the abusive litigation tort in its reversal of a dismissal in Crowley.
In Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal.4th 958, 87 P.3d 802, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 (2004), the
California Supreme Court explained that Merlet "simply involved application of the
familiar rule that subsidiary procedural actions cannot be the basis for malicious
prosecution claims." Zamos, 32 Cal. 4th at 969 n.8, 87 P.3d at 809 n.8, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d
at 63 n.8. So the true issue for decision in Merlet was not even broad enough for the
Merlet Court to be offering any explanation of the Crowley rationale, and its
"explanation," lacks any value compared to the express pronouncements and
expressed rationale of the Crowley decision in reversing a dismissal upon demurrer.
7

App. 1993). Bidna, for its rationale, relied entirely on imaginary effects of abusive tort
litigation over divorce cases. See 19 Cal. App. 4th at 30. There was no empirical
evidence before the Court to support its ruminations. Indeed, although the abusive
litigation tort has been around for scores of years, the veritable dearth of reported
decisions concerning its application to family law matters counsels a contrary
conclusion. The Oregon Court of Appeals, addressing that very defect in Bidna's logic
rejected any such hard and fast rule. After exposing the lack of any basis in fact to
support Bidna's sweeping policy declaration, the Oregon court reversed the dismissal of
an abusive litigation complaint that arose out of family law proceedings. See Vazquez
v. Reeves, 138 Or.App. 153, 159, 907 P.2d 254, 257 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).7 If such a
7

The Oregon Court of Appeals refuted Bidna's rationale as follows:

Perkins urges us to adopt the reasoning of Bidna v. Rosen, 19
Cal.App.4th 27, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251 (1993). There, the court declined to
extend the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings to family law cases for
three reasons: (1) because of the underlying bitterness and emotional
distress involved in many family law disputes, the task of distinguishing
between "ordinary" suits and "malicious" suits is extremely difficult; (2)
attorney fee awards sufficiently discourage frivolous litigation and
adequately ameliorate the effects of such litigation; and (3) extending
wrongful use of civil proceedings claims to family law disputes could have
a chilling effect on the commencement of meritorious actions. Id. 23
Cal.Rptr.2d at 257.
Although Bidna's rationales seem initially plausible, they are
ultimately unpersuasive. To begin with, we do not believe that the
potential difficulty of sorting out malicious, from ordinary, litigation
in the family law context is materially greater than in other species
of litigation to which the tort has been applied. See, e.g., Patapoff
v. Vollstedt's, Inc., 230 Or. 266, 369 P.2d 691 (1962) (claim
predicated on initiation of involuntary bankruptcy); Hill v. Carlstrom,
216 Or. 300, 305, 338 P.2d 645 (1959) (claim predicated on
initiation of insanity proceedings).
(continued...)
8

7

(...continued)
Nor do we accept Bidna's second assumption, that awards of attorney
fees and sanctions adequately deter the prosecution of baseless and bad
faith family law litigation and adequately compensate for losses from such
litigation. Here, for example, plaintiffs sought damages for emotional
distress and loss of comfort and companionship caused by the allegedly
wrongful removal of the children from their mother's care. Moreover, the
availability of attorney fees and sanctions, see ORS 20.105; [FN5]
ORCP 17, [FN6] is hardly unique to *158 family law litigation. If Bidna
were correct, the same considerations would, logically, warrant the
wholesale abolition of the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings.
FN5. ORS 20.105 provides, in part:
"In any civil action, suit or other proceeding in a district court, a circuit
court or the Oregon Tax Court, or in any civil appeal to or review by the
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the court shall award reasonable
attorney fees to a party against whom a claim, defense or ground for
appeal or review is asserted, if that party is a prevailing party in the
proceeding and to be paid by the party asserting the claim, defense or
ground, upon a finding by the court that the party willfully disobeyed a
court order or that there was no objectively reasonable basis for asserting
the claim, defense or ground for appeal."
FN6. ORCP 17 provides, in part:
"A. Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record * * *. The
signature constitutes a certificate that the person has read the pleading,
motion or other paper, that to the best of the knowledge, information and
belief of the person formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument * * *, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
ii *

*

*

*

*

"C. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule,
the court upon motion or upon its own initiative shall impose upon the
person who signed it, * * * an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney fee."
Finally, unlike the court in Bidna, we do not believe that the potential for tort
liability will chill the prosecution of meritorious family law claims. The rigorous
(continued...)
9

sweeping public policy exception to a recognized tort were to come from any source in
this state, it properly would be the prerogative of the Legislature, not the Courts, to
examine empirical data and ascertain whether any negative policy effect in fact exists in
this state from the application of the abusive litigation torts to divorce actions.
The remaining arguments of defendants concerning the abusive litigation torts
were anticipated and have already been fully addressed by Lynn in his Opening Brief,
so will not be repeated here.8 Lynn has properly pleaded a claim under the
requirements of Rule 8 and the tort at issue, and the dismissal should be reversed.
II.

THE OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY BY FOSTER FAMILY PROPERTIES, L.C. AND
FOSTER RENTALS, L.C. WAS IN NO WAY IN ISSUE IN THE DIVORCE ACTION.

In an effort to avoid slander of title liability to Foster Family Properties, L.C. and
Foster Rentals, L.C, both the Lawyers' Brief and Cathie's Brief apparently suggest that
a dispute over whether Lynn and Cathie owned the real property or whether Foster
Family Properties and Foster Rentals owned the real property was at issue in the

7

(...continued)
requirements for pleading and proving wrongful use claims, especially the
requirements of malice and lack of probable cause in prosecuting the underlying
action, adequately shield those who act in good faith.
8

Lynn does wish to address one palpable misstatement in the factual statement
of the Lawyers' Brief, at 6, H 10. The Lawyers' Brief argues in that factual statement
that "Lynn moved to alter or amend Judge Bohling's order on April 8, 2004, arguing
that a California decision issued almost ten years before oral argument on Saunders'
motion, Crowley v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083 (Cal. 1994), constituted intervening and
controlling authority justifying reversal." Id. (emphasis added). Lynn did cite such
case in his Rule 59 motion, for the purpose of demonstrating the "error in law" justifying
an amended judgment under Rule 59(a)(7). The false contention in the Lawyers' Brief
that Lynn argued that such case was "intervening and controlling authority" is
inexplicable, in light of the plain absence of any such statements in Lynn's
memorandum. See R. 642-643.
10

divorce action. See Lawyers' Brief at 17-19; Cathie's Brief at 13-16. That is certainly
not pleaded anywhere in the Amended Complaint and also is simply not true.
The defendants cite several cases to the effect that divorce courts retain
jurisdiction over properties fraudulently transferred or acquired long before the divorce.
That may be, but those were not the circumstances in the Foster divorce. Cathie had
signed quit claim deeds many years before the divorce, to independent legal entities.
She did not challenge those deeds in the divorce and did not seek to bring in the
transferees, Foster Family Properties and Foster Rentals, as parties, to assert any legal
or equitable challenge to their ownership. Indeed, both entities were successful in quiet
title actions against Lynn and Cathie. The respective ownership interests of Cathie and
Lynn in the entity Foster Rentals were clearly subject to the divorce court's jurisdiction,
but the property of non-party Foster Rentals clearly was not.
First, neither Lynn nor Cathie even owned any portion of Foster Family
Properties, L.C., R. 295, so ownership of that entity and real estate owned by that entity
could not touch upon a division of the marital estate in the divorce. The slander of title
contained in Cathie's affidavit concerning Foster Family Properties' good and
marketable title to real property could not be covered by the judicial privilege. While
Foster Family Properties, L.C. released Cathie Foster from any slander of title claim for
any publications she made of her affidavit, however, and so no suit was brought against
her in this case on that claim, no such release was granted to defendant Saunders or
the law firm for their own publications of that slander of Foster Family Properties' good
and marketable title. The release of Cathie and dismissal with prejudice of claims
based on her commission of a tort also cannot release, or act as claim preclusion
11

concerning, the separate torts committed by defendant Saunders in publishing the
slander of title.
As to Foster Rentals, L.C., Lynn and Cathie owned portions of the company, as
to which other person owned portions as well. While the ownership of that portion of
Foster Rentals, L.C. that was owned by Lynn and by Cathie was subject to division in
the divorce proceeding, the ownership of the remaining portion of Foster Rentals, L.C.
was completely unrelated to the divorce. Similarly, while a valuation of Foster Rentals,
L.C. as a business might have been relevant to assigning a value to each of Lynn and
Cathie's percentage of ownership of the company, Cathie's affidavit stating that she
and Lynn owned real property that she in fact had quit-claimed to the company many
years earlier, which transfers were not challenged, is a slander of the company's good
and marketable title in real property utterly unrelated to the divorce. No order of the
divorce court could take away the real estate owned by Foster Family Properties or
Foster Rentals, L.C. Cathie's contention to the contrary in her affidavit was simply a
knowingly false statement that slandered the title of non-parties and caused them to
incur special damages to obtain decrees quieting title. A claim has clearly been stated
and judicial privilege as an affirmative defense is not proven by the Amended
Complaint's allegations.
III.

SLANDER OF TITLE IS AN INJURY TO REAL PROPERTY.

On the issue of the applicable limitations period for slander of title, defendants
again cite many cases from other jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions, however, do not
have a decided Supreme Court case, as we do in Utah, distinguishing slander of title
from the personal tort of slander, and plainly defining the tort as one of injury caused to
12

real property. See Lynn's Opening Brief at 30-32. The effort in Cathie's Brief to
distinguish Bass v. Planned Management Servs., Inc., 761 P.2d 566 (Utah 1988), and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Howard v. Hudson,
259 F.2d 29, 32 (9th Cir. 1958), see Lynn's Opening Brief at 32, is based on a
misreading of Bass. Cathie argues, wrongly, that Bass "stated that slander of title
actions are different than slander of a person because slander of title relates to the
economic injury to an individual caused by defamation rather than a person's
reputation." Cathie's Brief at 21. This characterization of the language of Bass, is
simply wildly at variance with the actual language of the case, which, in discussing the
"economic injury" that defendants vaguely gloss over, plainly required "a specific
monetary loss flowing from a slander affecting the saleability or use of the property,
[or else] there is no damage." Bass, 761 P.2d at 568. Injury to the value of the
property is the gravamen of the action. There is therefore no analytical basis to
distinguish Howard, and Utah's specific, three-year, injury to property limitations period
must apply.9
IV.

CLAIM PRECLUSION CANNOT B E DECIDED O N T H E PLEADINGS.

Defendants bear the burden to prove to this court that claim preclusion applies.10
defendants are correct that no Utah case, Bass or later, has specifically had to
hold on that issue. The fact that those courts properly refrained from issuing advisory
dicta does not change the clear and logical result of what Bass did hold, when a Court,
like this Court, must hold on the issue.
10

ln Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance, 2002 UT 6, 44 P.3d 663, the Utah
Supreme Court made this burden clear:
The party moving a court to dismiss on claim preclusion grounds bears the
(continued...)
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The judgment in the quiet title action in the Foster Rentals, L.C. v. Foster, after quieting
title in Foster Rentals, L.C, as against both Lynn and Cathie, dismissed the remaining
claim for slander of title without prejudice. To prove otherwise, defendants would have
had to produce a judgment that said so, and they did not. Nor does the Amended
Complaint plead any adjudication on the merits of the slander of title claim. Therefore,
defendants cannot prove the necessary third element.11 No other set of facts, other
than that there was no adjudication on the merits, may be inferred from the Amended
Complaint.
As to the Foster Family Properties case, a stipulated order quieting title and
releasing Cathie was entered, dismissing the slander of title claim against her, with
prejudice. That is why no claim was pleaded against Cathie for slandering Foster
Family Properties' title. There was no release of any claims against Saunders or law
firm for their own commission of the tort of slander of title and there can be no inference
10

(...continued)
burden of establishing three elements, Maoris & Assocs., 2000 UT 93 at fl 20, 16
P.3d 1214 which are:
"First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies.
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been
presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should have
been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in
a final judgment on the merits"

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah
1988)); see also Culbertson, 2001 UT 108 at If 13, 44 P.3d 642. All three
elements must be established for claim preclusion to apply. See Madsen, 769
P.2d at 247.
Miller, 2002 UT 6 fi 58, 44 P.3d at 678.
11

"According to the third element, '[a]n adjudication upon the merits is ... required
[to establish] claim preclusion.'" Id. H 59.
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against Lynn that they did not commit their own acts in slander of Foster Family
Properties title. They are liable for their own acts, regardless of what Cathie did or did
not do. They were not parties to any prior action and no claims were asserted against
them previously. Thus, they cannot meet their burden on their own torts, regardless of
what Cathie did for which she was released.
V.

CATHIE'S ARGUMENTS O N DUTY, LEGAL CAUSE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE
GROUNDLESS, CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CATHIE AND
COUILLARD ON COUNTS IV AND V.

Cathie's argument that her filing of a purportedly joint tax return with the Internal
Revenue Service that contained materially false statements about Lynn's deductions
and individual filing status was not a legal cause of the audit he endured is difficult to
fathom. Her conduct hardly seems to be so removed from Lynn's injury, a la Palsgraf,
that it could be deemed unforeseeable. Indeed, the IRS seems to publicize in the
newspapers the various investigations they undertake due to red flags that are raised,
and it hardly seems that reporting false information to the IRS would not be deemed a
red flag. Of course, whether the false information was the cause-in-fact of the audit
might be open to debate, but the trial court's refusal to grant relief under Rule 56(f) to
allow discovery of the IRS to make that factual link, when discovery had not yet been
allowed to commence, was a clear abuse of discretion. Cathie also does not explain
how, having undertaken to make representations to the IRS about Lynn, she escapes
any duty to make those representations in a non-negligent fashion so as not to trigger
an audit of Lynn.
Of course, Count IV deals with negligent breach of duty. Count V deals with an
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intentional interference with Lynn's prospective economic relations. While Cathy
argues that those relations must be "business relations," she offers no explanation of
why the delay in receiving a refund that resulted in lost investment income is not a
"business relation." The right to invest in securities, or even certificates of deposit, most
certainly are business relations as to which Lynn was deprived and he is entitled to
recover his resulting investment loss under the tort of intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage. Again, the issue of cause-in-fact could not be proven
without discovery from the IRS, and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
uphold the rule 56(f) objection to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION

The Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and Rule 56 judgment of the trial court should be
reversed, as should its refusal to allow discovery, and the entire case should be
reinstated and remanded to allow discovery and further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
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\^c

day of February, 2005.
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Attorneys for the Appellants
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